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NOTE
THE IMPLICATIONS OF IFRS ON THE FUNCTIONING OF
THE SECURITIES ANTIFRAUD REGIME
IN THE UNITED STATES
Lance J. Phillips*
The United States is home to one of the most investor-friendly securi-
ties antifraud regimes in the world. Corporate misstatements that
form the basis for a cause of action under one of the many antifraud
provisions arise in a variety of contexts, an important one being as
violations of U.S. generally accepted accounting principles
("GAAP"). For several years, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion has been considering changing the standardized accounting
practice in the United States from GAAP to International Financial
Reporting Standards ("IFRS") to promote comparability between
global investment opportunities. IFRS is a principles-based system of
accounting, while GAAP is rules based. Because of the flexibility of
financial reporting inherent in the principles-based approach of
IFRS, investors and the Securities and Exchange Commission will
face greater difficulty in relying on accounting violations to establish
the elements of the securities antifraud causes of action if IFRS is
adopted.
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INTRODUCTION
Public companies in the United States have not always been required to
prepare financial statements in accordance with standardized accounting
practices. In fact, public companies in the United States have not always
been required to issue financial statements at all.' Of the billions of dollars
in new securities purchased during the years leading up to the Great De-
pression, most of the investment decisions were made without adequate
financial information.2 To protect investors, Congress enacted the Securities
3 4Act of 1933' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which force compa-
nies to make certain disclosures and seek to discourage fraud.5
Concomitant to the promulgation of the securities laws, the desire for
comparability between the financial positions of various firms and within
the same firm across time inspired the movement for a uniform system of
financial reporting. 6 In 1933, the American Institute of Accountants
7
1. Dan L. Goldwasser, The Audit Process, in ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY 1992, at 9, 12 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 440, 1992).
2. J. Arnold Pines, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Accounting Principles,
30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 727, 727 (1965).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
4. Id. §§ 78a-78111.
5. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 1
(2d ed. 2008). The Exchange Act established the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),
and the Securities Act gave the SEC the power to prescribe accounting rules for use in statements
filed with the SEC. The SEC has neglected to fully exercise this power, however, opting instead to
allow the accounting profession and corporate officers to develop the governing rules. Thomas D.
Flynn, Uniformity in Financial Accounting: A Progress Report, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 623,
625 (1965); see also Stephen A. Zeff, The Evolution of U.S. GAAP: The Political Forces Behind
Professional Standards (pt. 1), CPA J., Jan. 2005, at 19, 20 (noting that, in 1938, "[t]he SEC, by a
narrow vote, support[ed] a reliance on the private sector to establish GAAP" and that the SEC
"looks to the private sector for leadership").
6. Flynn, supra note 5, at 623-24; Jay H. Price, Jr. et al., Accounting Uniformity in the
Regulated Industries, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 824, 826 (1965) ("[T]he financial information
about itself that a business discloses will be substantially useful only if that information provides a
basis for comparing that business with others. Thus there is now a widely recognized need in the
investing community not only for publication of financial information about businesses but also for
the publication of reports that disclose essential factual differences and are therefore 'comparable' in
some degree.").
7. The American Institute of Accountants is now called the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants. Flynn, supra note 5, at 623.
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("AIA") adopted six broad principles that formed the basis for what later
came to be known as generally accepted accounting principles, or
GAAP-a term first used by the AIA in 1936.8 Authoritative rulings from
various official accounting standard-setting bodies9 combined with other
statements approved by a significant segment of the accounting profession
comprise the current body of U.S. GAAP.' °
The advantages of having comparable financial data among various
firms have garnered recurring relevance amidst the globalization of securi-
ties markets. Technological innovation has greatly facilitated cross-border
capital flows." The benefits of financial globalization have been wide-
spread. Two thousand and five marked the first year in which over half of
all global saving was invested abroad.'
2
Though technological advancements have eliminated some barriers to
cross-border securities transactions, other barriers remain. For example,
variations in standardized accounting practices create one of the biggest
impediments to worldwide capital-market integration by hindering the abil-
ity of investors to compare financial data and by forcing companies to
compile financial statements that comply with the reporting requirements of
every country in which they wish to enlist. 3
Every country with an established securities market now requires compa-
nies to comply with a standardized accounting practice, "4 but not all
standardized accounting practices are alike. Some countries, including the
United States, employ a "homegrown" system developed by a wholly internal
8. Zeff, supra note 5, at 20.
9. After the AIA adopted the original six GAAP rules, it created the Committee on Ac-
counting Procedure ("CAP") to oversee the development of accounting standards. In 1959, the AIA
replaced the CAP with the Accounting Principles Board ("APB"). In 1972, the AIA replaced the
APB with the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), which is the current official ac-
counting standard-setting body in the United States. Zeff, supra note 5, at 22-23, 27.
10. E.g., BARRY J. EPSTEIN ET AL., WILEY GAAP CODIFICATION ENHANCED 1-5 (2009).
11. Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with
International Financial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 8982, Ex-
change Act Release No. 58,960, 94 SEC Docket 1703 (Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter IFRS Roadmap].
12. HALL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 18 (2d ed. 2008).
13. See Frederick D. S. Choi & Richard M. Levich, Introduction and Overview, in INTER-
NATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS IN A WORLD OF ACCOUNTING DIFFERENCES 1, 3 (Frederick D. S.
Choi & Richard M. Levich eds., 1994) ("[Olne half of [the institutional investors, corporate issuers,
investment underwriters and market regulators in major financial centers in Germany, Japan, Swit-
zerland, the United Kingdom and the United States] interviewed reported being bothered by
national accounting differences."); ScoTT, supra note 12, at 97 ("[T]he need to reconcile financial
statements with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) has been a major obstacle to
foreign companies listing on US exchanges."); Kun Young Chang, Reforming U.S. Disclosure Rules
in Global Securities Markets, 22 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 237, 241 (2003) ("[Mlany com-
mentators have pointed out that the primary obstacle to a foreign company entering the U.S. market
is the increased disclosure costs that accompany the need to reconcile their financial statements to
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles ... ").
14. See generally INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS IN A WORLD OF ACCOUNTING DIF-
FERENCES, supra note 13.
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body and often unique in substance, known as a local GAAP system.'-
Many other countries have adopted the International Financial Reporting
Standards ("IFRS") as the official domestic accounting practice. IFRS is a
system of financial reporting developed by the International Accounting
Standards Board ("IASB"),'6 a private and independent international stan-
dard-setting body comprised of representatives from several different
countries. 
7
Since its origination in 1973, IFRS has spread with considerable popu-• 8
larity. In 2005 the European Union adopted it with a few minor variations,
marking a major milestone in the move toward global uniform accounting
standards. Other major securities markets including Hong Kong, Australia,
New Zealand, Singapore, and the Philippines have since followed suit,' 9 and
there are currently over 100 IFRS-based countries.0
The future of IMRS in the United States is still uncertain. The SEC cur-
rently permits foreign countries to compile financial reports in accordance
with IFRS without reconciling them to U.S. GAAP. 2' The question is
whether the SEC will either permit or require U.S. companies to use IFRS
in lieu of U.S. GAAP.
22
In 2008, the SEC published its Roadmap for the Potential Use of Finan-
cial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Financial
Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers, 2' a proposed time line for U.S. conver-
sion from GAAP to IFRS. The report contemplates conversion by 2014,
with a select category of companies eligible for IFRS by 2010.24 Though the
proposed roadmap for conversion is not binding, many commentators inside
15. Canada, Japan, and China also use local GAAP systems. See Ian Hague, International
Financial Reporting Standards, J. Bus. VALUATION, Feb. 2009, at 1, 2.
16. Until 2001, the IASB was known as the International Accounting Standards Committee
("IASC"). See Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in Accor-
dance with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP,
Securities Act Release No. 8818, Exchange Act Release No. 55,998, 90 SEC Docket 2694 (July 2,
2007).
17. According to the IASB Constitution, "The governance of the [IASB] shall rest with the
[Board of] Trustees... .' INrT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM. FOUND. CONST. pt. A, cl. 3 (rev.
2009). There must be six trustees appointed from the Asia/Oceania region, six trustees appointed
from Europe, six trustees appointed from North America, and four trustees appointed from any area,
subject to the requirement of overall geographic balance. Id. at pt. A, cl. 6.
18. Richard Fleck & Kathryn Cearns, Developments in International Accounting Standards,
42 INT'L LAW. 501, 502 & n.10 (2008).
19. Stuart H. Deming, International Accounting Standards, 40 INT'L LAW. 363, 365 (2006).
20. Robert N. Rapp & Eric S. Zell, On the Road to IFRS in the United States, BANKING &
FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., Feb. 2009, at 1, 1. Several countries still using local GAAP systems
have implemented plans to convert to IFRS in the near future. Canada, Japan, and China, for exam-
ple, all expect to operate under IFRS by 2011. Id.
21. See SCOTT, supra note 12, at 98-99.
22. See id. at 99-100.
23. IFRS Roadmap, supra note 11.
24. See id. at 4.
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and outside of the accounting profession nevertheless believe that conver-
sion is a matter of when and not if.25
Numerous countervailing considerations inform the debate surrounding
the prudence of conversion. IFRS advocates continue to rely on the age-old
comparability justification for support.26 IFRS opponents, on the other hand,
identify several potential problems. They argue:
[M]andatory [implementation of IFRS by U.S. issuers] will result in a high
risk that users of financial information will be confused and thus lack con-
fidence in the information; companies will not have the expertise to
implement an entirely new set of rules; auditors will struggle to accept
conflicting policies that companies within the same industry may adopt;
and finally, and most importantly, companies will incur significant costs in
implementing the rules with little or no tangible benefit at a time when the
economy is very weak."
IFRS opponents also cite the difficulty of reorganizing account-
ing-education curriculum 2' and the susceptibility of the IASB to political
29
pressure.
What the pundits of conversion have not considered is the impact that
the substantive differences between GAAP and IFRS will have on the func-
tioning of the securities antifraud regime in the United States. Given that
former SEC Commissioner Christopher Cox has emphasized that the inter-
ests of investors will drive the decision to adopt IFRS in the United States,3°
and that the securities antifraud regime is perhaps the most potent inves-
tor-protection vehicle in the United States, it is surprising that the
implications of IFRS on the domestic securities antifraud regime have
largely been overlooked." The various aspects of U.S. securities regulation
are inextricably interrelated. A change in the rules governing financial
25. E.g., Rapp & Zell, supra note 20, at I ("[T]he move to IFRS has been widely described
as inevitable .... ); Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, International Financial Reporting
Standards Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.ifrs.comifrsjfaqs.html#q4 (last visited Aug. 25,
2009) ("Many people believe that acceptance of IFRS in the United States by the SEC for public
companies are [sic] inevitable.").
26. See, e.g., IFRS Roadmap, supra note II ("With a single set of accounting standards,
investors can more easily compare information and will be in a better position to make informed
investment decisions.").
27. Letter from Carl T. Berquist, Executive Vice President of Marriott Int'l, Inc., to Florence
E. Harmon, Acting Sec'y of the SEC, at 1 (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http:// www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-27-08/s72708-36.pdf.
28. See id.
29. See Letter from Sharon Sabba Fierstein, President of the N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified
Pub. Accountants, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y of the SEC, at 3 (March 5, 2009) available at
http://www.nysscpa.org/commentletter/sec09.pdf ("Questions about IASB's ability to weather po-
litical pressures raise serious doubts about its ability to issue high quality standards.").
30. Rapp & Zell, supra note 20, at 2.
31. This Note does not take a position on whether the current level of investor protection, as
reflected by the various antifraud securities laws, is appropriate. It merely takes the antifraud regime
as Congress and the SEC have designed it, and argues that IFRS jeopardizes the status quo. Nor
does this Note take a position on whether IFRS will either encourage or discourage fraudulent re-
porting by companies. See infra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
February 2010]
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disclosure cannot be considered in isolation of the effects it might have on
the functioning of the antifraud provisions. This Note argues that the princi-
ples-based approach of IFRS, which provides companies with increased
flexibility in financial reporting, will threaten the current level of success
enjoyed by plaintiffs bringing claims under the various federal securities
antifraud laws. Part I explains the role that GAAP violations have tradition-
ally played in securities-fraud cases under U.S. law. Part II articulates some
of the important differences between IFRS and GAAP and places special
emphasis on the flexibility in financial reporting allowed under the former
as compared to the latter. Part III argues that the flexibility of FRS will
diminish the ability of shareholders and the SEC to rely on accounting vio-
lations to establish the elements of securities-fraud claims, particularly the
existence of a misstatement and scienter.
I. THE ROLE OF GAAP VIOLATIONS IN SECURITIES-FRAUD CASES
This Part explains the role that GAAP violations have traditionally
played in securities-fraud cases. Section L.A provides a brief introduction to
the antifraud framework in the United States. Section I.B shows that GAAP
violations have frequently been used to prove the existence of a misstate-
ment, one element required in securities-fraud cases, and scienter, another
oft-required element.
A. The U.S. Securities Antifraud Regime
The U.S. securities-law framework is among the most comprehensive
and investor friendly in the world.32 Investor protection has always been the
primary motivation behind government regulation of securities transac-
tions,33 and Congress has passed many acts that seek to accomplish this goal
in various ways. 4 But when it comes to protecting investors from corporate
fraud and deception, the Securities Act of 1933 3 ("Securities Act") and the
Securities Exchange Act of 193436 ("Exchange Act") do most of the heavy
lifting. Four provisions in particular provide shareholders and the SEC with
32. See SCOTT, supra note 12, at 39 ("The prospect of incurring liability [for securities
fraud] hangs over the U.S. capital market .... [I]t deters foreign companies from issuing and listing
securities in the United States, and.., it has encouraged the expansion of private markets, with less
liability than public markets.").
33. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 5, at 1.
34. Generally speaking, seven federal statutes govern the distribution of U.S. securities: the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Investment
Company Act of 1940, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. ScoTT, supra note 12, at 26. These
acts protect investors by discouraging fraud, forcing companies to keep accurate books and records,
requiring companies to make certain disclosures, and prohibiting companies from prematurely hyp-
ing public securities distributions, among others.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
36. Id. §§ 78a-78111.
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the weaponry needed to combat corporate fraud: Sections 11, 37 12," and 17'9
of the Securities Act and Section 10 of the Exchange Act *° (and rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder).4'
Section 11 of the Securities Act creates a civil cause of action for mis-
statements and omissions in a registration statement filed with the SEC
pursuant to a public offering. 2 The information that a company is required
to include in a registration statement depends in large part on the size of the
company,43 but in all cases companies are required to disclose a minimum
amount of transaction-related information, information pertaining to exhib-
its and undertakings, and company information, including financial
information." According to Section 11, if, on the date the SEC declares the
registration statement effective, it contains "an untrue statement of a material
fact or omit[s] to state a material fact required ... to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security" is entitled to bring
suit against any number of an enumerated list of statutory defendants. 45 To
prevail on a Section 11 claim, a plaintiff must prove only that the registration
statement contained a misstatement or omission, and that the misstatement or
omission was material, meaning a reasonable investor would view it as sig-
nificant given the "total mix" of information available.46
37. Id. § 77k.
38. Id. § 771.
39. Id. § 77q.
40. Id. § 78j(b).
41. See Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need
for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J.
CoRnP. & FIN. L. 89, 92-93 (2003); see also Gary M. Brown, Exemptions from Registration Under
the Securities Act of 1933, in UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 2007, at 193, 195 (PLI Corp.
Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1618, 2007); Mark D. Wood, Liability for Securi-
ties Law Violations, in UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 2008, at 771, 773 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1690, 2008). Several other provisions seek to discour-
age fraud, either directly or indirectly. For example, Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange
Act requires that companies "make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer." 15
U.S.C. § 78m. Further, Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act requires that the chief executive
officer and chief financial officer personally certify that reports filed with the SEC, among other
things, "fairly present in all material respects" the company's results and financial position. Id.
§ 7241(a)(3). Provisions such as these, however, are supplemental to, and often overlap with, the
core antifraud provisions. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 5, at 174. ("The specter of antifraud
liability is bolstered by numerous other mechanisms that encourage accurate disclosures [such as
Section 13(b)(2)(A)].").
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
43. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 5, at 426-27 (describing the two basic forms for the
registration statement available to domestic companies engaged in a public offering).
44. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77g (describing information required in registration statements).
Form S-3 issuers may incorporate company information by reference to past and future SEC filings.
CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 5, at 427.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
46. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 5, at 503. Section II defendants are entitled to assert a
number of possible defenses, the most important of which is the due-diligence defense contained in
Section I1 (b)(3). Id. at 505-06.
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Section 12(a)(2) creates a civil cause of action for misstatements and
omissions contained in a prospectus.4 In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,41 the
Supreme Court held that, as contemplated by Section 12(a)(2), the term
prospectus refers to a document that "describes a public offering of securi-
ties by an issuer or controlling shareholder" and that is "held out to the
public. 49 Though the scope of the Gustafson definition of prospectus is not
entirely clear, it undoubtedly encompasses the final statutory prospectus
required by 10(a) of the Securities Act.5 According to Section 10(a), the
final statutory prospectus must contain substantially the same "information
contained in the registration statement," with a few acceptable omissions."
Thus, a prospectus will also often include a minimum amount of transac-
tion-related information, information pertaining to exhibits and
undertakings, and company information, including financial information.
Under 12(a)(2), "[a]ny person who ... offers or sells a security ... by
means of a prospectus ... which includes an untrue statement of a material
fact ... shall be liable ... to the person purchasing such security from
him." 2 A Section 12(a)(2) plaintiff must prove the existence of a misstate-
ment or omission, that the misstatement or omission was material, and that
there is some causal connection between the prospectus and the decision to
buy the securities.
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act contains three general antifraud pro-
visions. It authorizes suit against a seller of a security who has (1) employed
a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) obtained money or property by
means of material misstatements or omissions, or (3) engaged in a course of
business that operated as fraud upon the purchaser 4 Though the Supreme
Court has never addressed the issue, most circuit courts agree that no private
right of action exists under Section 17(a).5 For this reason, it has been most
valuable in civil actions brought by the SEC and in criminal actions brought
by the Justice Department. 6 Regardless of whether the action is brought
under 17(a)(1), (2), or (3), the SEC or the Justice Department needs to prove
47. 15 U.S.C. § 771.
48. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
49. Id. at 584.
50. The final statutory prospectus is the prospectus that must accompany every sale of a
security under Section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2).
51. Id. § 77j(a)(1).
52. Id. § 771(a).
53. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 5, at 562. Courts have allowed plaintiffs to satisfy
the final requirement by showing only that the prospectus was broadly disseminated to the public
and that it likely influenced the market price. E.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222,
1225-27 (7th Cir. 1980).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
55. Paul Vizcarrondo, Jr. & Andrew C. Houston, Liabilities Under Sections 11, 12, 15 and 17
of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10, 18, and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in
UNDERSTANDING THE SEcuRTIs LAws 2006, at 537, 575 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. B-1556, 2006).
56. Id.
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the existence of a misstatement, 57 and that the misstatement was
material.58 If the action is brought under 17(a)(1), the SEC or Justice De-
partment needs to prove scienter, 9 but if the action is brought under 17(a)(2)
or (3) a showing of simple negligence will sufficer °
Rule lOb-5, promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, au-
thorizes suit against a buyer or seller of a security who has (1) employed a
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) made an untrue statement of ma-
terial fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made not misleading, or (3) engaged in a course of business that
operated as fraud upon any person.6' Rule lOb-5 is textually similar to Sec-
tion 17(a) of the Securities Act in many respects. In fact, the SEC used
62Section 17(a) as guidance when it drafted Rule 10b-5. There are, however,
important differences between the two. Notably, lOb-5 authorizes suit
against the buyer of a security while Section 17 does not.63 Further, while
many circuits foreclose a private shareholder from bringing suit under Sec-
tion 17, all courts agree that a violation of lOb-5 gives rise to a private right
of action.64 Finally, while a showing of scienter is required only in an action
under Section 17(a)(1), it is required in all actions brought under Rule
lOb-5. 65 In addition to scienter, all plaintiffs bringing a rule lOb-5 cause of
66
action must prove the existence of a misstatement, that the misstatement
67
was material, and that the fraud was perpetrated "in connection" with the
57. The term "misstatement" as contemplated here includes "devices" to defraud and
"courses of business" to defraud. See id. at 578 ("[C]ourts have recognized that virtually any action
against a seller that can be brought under... § 17(a)(1) can also be brought under § 17(a)(2) or (3),
since virtually any 'device .. . to defraud' that violates the former provisions will 'operate as a
fraud' in violation of § 17(a)(3) or involve obtaining money or property by means of misstatements
or omissions in violation of § 17(a)(2).").
58. Id. at 575. In the few circuits that permit a private cause of action under 17(a), a private
plaintiff must also show reliance and loss causation as well. See id. at 579-80.
59. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980).
60. GARY M. BROWN, SODERQUIST ON THE SECURITIES LAWS § 8:3.4 (5th ed. 2006).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
62. See BROWN, supra note 60, § 8:3.4, at 8-27.
63. See Vizcarrondo & Houston, supra note 55, at 537-39.
64. E.g., CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 5, at 241 ("[Tjhe private cause of action under Rule
lOb-5 is judicially implied .... "). Rule lOb-5 is the most widely used securities antifraud provision
available, largely because it provides for a private right of action. E.g., Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan
R. Bromberg, SEC Rule 10b-5 and Its New Statute of Limitations: The Circuits Defy the Supreme
Court, 51 Bus. LAW. 309, 310 (1996). Also contributing to the frequency with which plaintiffs bring
l0b-5 cases is that under lOb-5 plaintiffs can sue for misstatements made in any context, unlike
under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, which require the misstatement to arise in a
registration statement and a prospectus, respectively.
65. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 5, at 271.




purchase or sale of securities. 6' Private litigants, but not the SEC, must also
prove reliance 69 and loss causation. 7°
B. GAAP Violations as Probative of the Elements of
Securities Antifraud Causes of Action
Companies are required to provide financial information to investors
when they file registration statements and annual and quarterly filings with
the SEC and issue statutory prospectuses, and companies voluntarily dis-
71close financial information in a variety of other circumstances . In all cases,
companies must prepare financial information in accordance with GAAP, or
in the manner that is most directly comparable to GAAP.' Though the fail-
ure to follow GAAP is, by itself, insufficient to support a securities-fraud
claim,73 evidence that a company has committed a GAAP violation is proba-
tive of the elements of securities antifraud causes of action, most notably the
elements of misstatement and scienter.74
1. Existence of a Misstatement
Sections 11, 12, and 17 of the Securities Act and Rule lOb-5 of the Ex-
change Act all require the plaintiff to identify a misstatement as a
prerequisite to bringing suit.75 The term misstatement is broad enough to
76
encompass a wide range of activity that misleads the reasonable investor,
and since materiality is a separate inquiry,77 the extent of the misrepresenta-
68. Id. at 248.
69. Id. at 305.
70. Id. at 315.
71. Examples include press releases, public announcements, and pro forma financials. Some
commentators believe that the informal disclosure process has become the preferred way of com-
municating with the market. J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE,
at xxvii (3d ed. Supp. 2007).
72. See ROBERT N. ANTHONY & JAMES S. REECE, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 16 (6th ed.
1989) ("The SEC requires [public] companies to file accounting reports prepared in accordance with
GAAP."). Regulation G, adopted by the SEC pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, says that if a
company voluntarily discloses material financial information, the company must also disclose "a
presentation of the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure and a reconciliation of the
disclosed non-GAAP financial measure to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure."
CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 5, at 173.
73. E.g., Zaluski v. United Am. Healthcare Corp., 527 F.3d 564, 576 (6th Cir. 2008); SEC v.
Seghers, 298 F. App'x 319, 331 (5th Cir. 2008).
74. See 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON
SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 6:54.10 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that claims of GAAP
violation can add support to allegations that financial representations are false and made with sci-
enter).
75. See supra Section I.A.
76. 5C ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE & REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 12:2
(2001) (identifying eleven specific "duties" that flow from the general duty to avoid misrepresenta-
tions).
77. Id. § 12:5.
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tion is irrelevant to the determination of whether a misrepresentation exists.
A GAAP violation normally produces a misstatement for purposes of the
securities antifraud causes of action." In fact, the SEC presumes that a fi-
nancial statement that does not comply with GAAP is misleading.79
Financial statements containing inaccurate figures are most certainly mis-
leading,' o but so are transactions inaccurately reported. For example, courts
have found financial statements misleading when earnings are manipulated
through improper deferral techniques, debt of consolidated subsidiaries is
omitted from a consolidated balance sheet, shipping costs are included in
overhead rather than in operating expenses, earnings per share are stated
without noting the dilution of residual securities, and in many other situa-
tions involving violations of GAAP.8
Not only are most GAAP violations also misstatements, but a large
number of misstatements that give rise to fraud actions under the securities
laws are GAAP violations. A study conducted by Cornerstone Research82
found that forty-four percent of securities-fraud complaints filed in 2008
alleged GAAP violations."
2. Scienter
Though negligent misrepresentations can give rise to liability under
Sections 11, 12(a)(2), 17(a)(2), and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant acted with scienter to prevail under Section
17(a)(1) of the Securities Act and Rule 1Ob-5.4 The Supreme Court has de-
fined scienter as intent to defraud, but it has suggested that recklessness may
85be sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement as well. The current rela-
tionship between scienter and GAAP violations can be considered only in
light of the requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ("PSLRA")1 6 which dictates the standard under which scienter allega-
tions are scrutinized at the pleadings stage.
78. BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 74, § 6:54.120; JACOBS, supra note 76, § 12:23.
79. 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (2009).
80. JACOBS, supra note 76, § 12:23.
81. Id.
82. Cornerstone Research provides consulting and informational services to attorneys en-
gaged in a wide variety of cases involving numerous industries. Cornerstone Research,
http://www.cornerstone.com (follow "Practices" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).
83. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS 2008: A YEAR IN REVIEW
21 (2009), http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2008.pdf.
84. See supra Section I.A.
85. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).




Congress enacted the PSLRA in 1995 as a means of discouraging
87
meritless and abusive securities litigation. Among other protective meas-
ures, the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead with particularity the facts
evidencing scienter. A complaint satisfies this requirement only if the
stated facts "giv[e] rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
the required state of mind."8 9 Characterized in this manner, essentially as a
look into the defendant's mind, scienter is inherently difficult to prove.
Courts have, however, identified several "red flags" that may provide the
"strong inference" necessary to satisfy the requirements of the PSLRA.
Scienter may exist, for example, when an insider trades at a suspicious time
or in an unusual amount, there is a divergence between internal reports and
external statements on the same subject, an allegedly fraudulent statement is
followed immediately by the disclosure of inconsistent information, the de-
fendants have an interest in saving their jobs or salaries, or the most current
factual information is disregarded before the allegedly fraudulent statements
are made.90
Allegations of garden-variety GAAP violations, standing alone, do not
give rise to the "strong inference" of scienter necessary to satisfy the
PSLRA.91 GAAP violations are, however, highly probative of scienter.
Such a conclusion is logically sound. One commentator notes:
GAAP violation is supportive [of scienter] insofar as GAAP are a some-
what coherent and comprehensive and reasonably accessible scheme. They
are professional standards with which accountants are supposed to be fa-
miliar. Licensing and continuing education requirements support that
supposition. So do annual or more frequent requirements to certify con-
87. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) ("As a check
against abusive litigation by private parties, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 (PSLRA).").
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006).
89. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
90. City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 683-84 (6th
Cir. 2005).
91. E.g., W. Pa. Elec. Employees Benefits Funds v. Ceridian Corp. (In re Ceridian Corp.
Sec. Litig.), 542 F.3d 240, 246 (8th Cir. 2008); Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Integrated Elec.
Servs, Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 552 (5th Cir. 2007); Abrams v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 432
(5th Cir. 2002); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir. 1999); Jonathan C.
Dickey & Shoshanah V. Asnis, Securities Litigation Update, in Am. LAW INST.-AM. BAR ASS'N
COMM. ON CONTINUING PROF'L EDUC., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW:
ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, at 505, 513 (2003) ("There is an emerging consensus
among the courts that the mere allegation that an issuer violated generally accepted accounting
principles ('GAAP'), standing alone, is insufficient to meet the PSLRA's scienter requirement.").
92. E.g., In re MicroStrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 635-40 (E.D. Va. 2000)
("[W]hile it is true that it cannot be strongly inferred from bare allegations of a GAAP violation or a
restatement of financials that a defendant acted recklessly, consciously, or intentionally, it is not true
that nothing can be inferred from those facts at all ...."); In re Triton Energy, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No.
5:98-CV-256, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5920, at *33-34 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2001) (rejecting notion
that GAAP violations are not probative of scienter).
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formity with GAAP. Consequently, GAAP violations are more likely to be
intentional than accidental. 9'
Or, as one court put it, the "books do not cook themselves., 94 Courts
are more willing to defer to GAAP violations when they are accompanied
by other evidence of scienter. 9' Many courts have held, however, that the
requisite "other evidence" of scienter can derive from the nature of the
GAAP violation itself.9 ' Thus, despite the widely accepted mantra that
evidence of GAAP violations alone is insufficient to establish scienter,
violations that are particularly pervasive or significant in 
may be sufficient in themselves to sustain the scienter requirement under
Section 17(a)(1) and Rule lOb-5.
93. BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 74, § 6:54.10; see also In re MicroStrategy, 115
F. Supp. 2d at 638 ("The inference invited by the large magnitude of the misstated financials and the
repetitiveness of the GAAP violations takes on added significance if, as the Complaint alleges, the
violated GAAP rules and Company accounting policies are, in fact, relatively simple. This is so
because violations of simple rules are obvious, and an inference of scienter becomes more probable
as the violations become more obvious."); In re Gilat Satellite Networks, Ltd., No. CV-02-1510
(CPS), 2005 WL 2277476, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2005) ("GAAP violations that involve the
premature recognition of revenue have been said to suggest a conscious choice to recognize revenue
in a manner improper, and may therefore support a stronger inference of scienter.") (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted).
94. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1273 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
95. E.g., City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Sonic Solutions, No. C 07-05111 CW,
2009 WL 942182, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2009) ("Though the magnitude of Defendants' account-
ing violation alone does not demonstrate scienter, together with other allegations, it could amount to
the requisite mental state.").
96. In re Microstrategy, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 635 ("The mere fact that there was a restatement
or violation of GAAP, by itself, cannot give rise to a strong inference of scienter; the nature of such
a restatement or violation, however, may ultimately do so."); e.g., Magruder v. Halliburton Co., No.
3:05-CV-1 156-M, 2009 WL 854656, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2009) ("[Elven though GAAP viola-
tions alone are insufficient to establish scienter, when the number, size, timing, nature, frequency,
and context of the misapplication of accounting principles or restatement are taken into account, the
balance of the inferences to be drawn from such allegations may shift significantly in favor of sci-
enter.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
97. In re Gilat, 2005 WL 2277476, at *20 ("Repeated and pervasive GAAP violations may
be sufficient to establish the requisite inference.").
98. In re PEC Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d 379, 389 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[l~t is certainly
possible that some egregious GAAP violations may support an inference of scienter for pleadings
purposes."); In re UTStarcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 964, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("[T]he
magnitude and extent of the [GAAP violations] gives [sic] rise to at least an equally strong infer-
ence of scienter."); Chalverus v. Pegasystems, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 226, 234 (D. Mass. 1999)
("Courts have held that significant overstatements of revenue tend to support the conclusion that the
defendants acted with scienter.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Sherrie R. Savett, Securities
Class Actions Since the 1995 Reform Act: A Plaintiff's Perspective, in SECURITIES LITIGATION AND
ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2006, at 35, 88 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No.
B-1557, 2006) ("Many courts have held that the sheer magnitude of GAAP violations, overstate-
ments, or write-offs are [sic] a sufficient 'red flag' to support a strong inference of scienter."). But
see h, re Raytheon Sec. Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d 131, 155 (D. Mass. 2001) ("The magnitude of the
misstatement, combined with the internal documents.., at most supports a garden-variety inference
of recklessness or a strong inference of negligence-but that is not enough."); In re SCB Computer
Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 149 F. Supp. 2d 334, 359 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (declining to follow cases




Thus, GAAP violations are probative of two of the elements of the se-
curities antifraud causes of action, the existence of a misstatement and
scienter. If GAAP and IFRS were identical in all material respects, a U.S.
conversion to the latter would have no significant effect on the functioning
of the securities antifraud regime. As Part II explains, however, this is not
the case.
II. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GAAP AND IFRS
This Part highlights the significant differences in the accounting rules
under IFRS as compared to the accounting rules under GAAP. Section
II.A discusses the broad conceptual difference between IFRS and GAAP,
namely, that the former is "principles based" while the latter is "rules
based." Section II.B delves into a smattering of specific differences be-
tween the two accounting systems. It gives particular attention to the
accounting treatments where the differences are the most profound and the
issues appear most frequently in securities-fraud cases.
A. "Rules Based" vs. "Principles Based"
Regardless of the industry subject to regulation, 99 regulators need to
decide between implementing a rules-based system or a principles-based100
system. Generally speaking, rules provide detailed guidance on how an
entity should behave.' ° They decline to inquire into the substance of a
specific situation and opt instead to focus on the form.' °2 Under a
rules-based system, a predetermined legal result flows from the existence
of certain particularized facts.0 3 A parent who tells his child to be home at
99. The debate between rules and principles arises in many different industries. See gener-
ally Daniel Bodansky, Rules vs. Standards in International Environmental Law, 98 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 275 (2004) (regulation of environmental law); John Braithwaite & Valerie
Braithwaite, The Politics of Legalism: Rules versus Standards in Nursing Home Regulation, 4 Soc.
& LEGAL STUD. 307 (1995) (regulation of nursing homes); Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Stan-
dards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007) (regulation of antitrust law);
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (discuss-
ing the decision between rules and standards generally); Sumit K. Majumdar & Alfred A. Marcus,
Research Note, Rules versus Discretion: The Productivity Consequences of Flexible Regulation, 44
ACAD. MGrMr. J. 170 (2001) (the regulation of electric utility companies).
100. Note, however, that the dichotomy between rules and standards is not strict. Regulations
can occupy every inch of the vast middle ground between the two. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin,
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 30 (2000)
("The legal forms of rules and standards, then, are better understood as spanning a spectrum rather
than as being dichotomous variables.").
101. Jim Psaros & Ken T. Trotman, The Impact of the Type of Accounting Standards on Pre-
parers'Judgments, 40 ABACUS 76, 76 (2004) ("Some accounting standards are very specific in their
wording and very direct in their requirements of account preparers .... ).
102. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles
versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1037 (2003) ("[R]ule-based systems tend toward formalism,
with the statement of the rule dominating over both the purpose at hand and the particulars of a
given case.").
103. Korobkin, supra note 100, at 23.
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midnight sharp, but then provides a list of fifteen specific contingencies
that will justify a late arrival, is a parent who governs his household under
a rules-based regime.'
Conversely, principles provide an entity with a broadly stated direc-
tive,'05 but allow the entity flexibility in choosing a course of conduct.0
6
The regulator will then scrutinize the substance of the entity's activity to
determine if it comports with the spirit of the objective embodied by the
principle.'' So characterized, principles often require an ex post determina-
tion of compliance.' A parent who tells his child to be home at a
reasonable hour, and then determines reasonableness by taking into account
the weather, the age of the child, and the next day's activities, governs his
household under a principles-based regime. 0
Accountants consider GAAP a rules-based system and IFRS a princi-
ples-based system. l0 IFRS consistently incorporates the concept of
reasonableness,"' while GAAP provides accountants with a much more par-
ticularized and thorough set of requirements. As one prominent
accounting firm has noted, the goal of GAAP is accordance with GAAP,
104. Lawrence M. Gill, IFRS: Coming to America, J. ACCT., June 2007, at 70,71.
105. Psaros & Trotman, supra note 101, at 76 ("[Some accounting] standards are more gen-
eral in their wording and guidance to users...."); Alix Nyberg Stuart, Standing on Principles: In a
world with more regulation than ever can the accounting rulebook be thrown away?, CFO MAG.,
Sept. 1, 2006, at 45, 49, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7852613 ("[P]rinciples offer
only 'a modicum' of implementation guidance and few scope exceptions or bright-lines.").
106. E.g., Robert Hall, The Difference Between Principles and Rules, ABA BANK MKTG.,
June 2002, at 11, 11 ("[Principles] leave latitude for how [a desired] outcome might be reached
107. Korobkin, supra note 100, at 23 ("Standards, in contrast, require legal decision makers to
apply a background principle or set of principles to a particularized set of facts in order to reach a
legal conclusion?').
108. See Kaplow, supra note 99, at 559-62.
109. Gill, supra note 104, at 70, 71.
110. GEORGE J. BENSTON ET AL., WORLDWIDE FINANCIAL REPORTING 214 (2006); Remi
Forgeas, Is IFRS That Different From U.S. GAAP?, CPA INSIDER, June 16, 2006, available at http://
www.ifrs.com/overview/General/differences.html. If, through case law or by other means, IFRS
does in fact become much more detailed, then IFRS will become a rules-based system, the flexibil-
ity in financial reporting will be gone, and the problems caused by the flexibility in financial
reporting identified in this Note will not be problems anymore. Though it is possible that IFRS may
evolve into a rules-based system, it is impossible to predict the likelihood of this happening or how
long it would take. Further, the SEC has not indicated that it will require such an evolution as a
condition of acceptance in the United States. Thus, all along the SEC has contemplated adopting a
flexible, principles-based system, a decision that would have significant implications on the domes-
tic antifraud regime.
I l1. E.g., Paul Laska, A Comparison: IFRS vs. US GAAP, RELEVANTE NEWSLETTER (Rele-
vante, Media, Pa.), Nov. 2007, at 1, http:llwww.relevante.comlimages/audit-whitepapaprs/ifrs
nov07-ifrs-gaap.pdf ("[A]n IFRS guideline to the purchasing manager might be 'pay a reasonable
price for an appropriately sized computer.' GAAP, on the other hand, would say something like 'pay
no more than $1,000 for a computer.' ").
112. E.g., Bert J. Zarb, The Quest for Transparency in Financial Reporting: Should Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards Replace U.S. GAPP?, CPA J., Sept. 2006, at 30, 32 ("U.S.




while the goal of IFRS is to give a "fair view" of a company's financial po-
sition." 3 The lack of guidance and emphasis on substance under IFRS
commonly requires management to employ estimates, assumptions, and
judgment calls in financial reporting.14
A crude, but perhaps the most effective, way to illustrate the broad con-
ceptual difference between the two systems is to compare the sheer volume
of GAAP and IFRS literature. " ' Though new promulgations are issued on
an ongoing basis, IFRS regulations, in their entirety, currently compose ap-
proximately 2000 pages of text."6 From all its sources, U.S. GAAP consists
of 2000 separate pronouncements, many of which are several hundred pages
long.'
17
B. Specific Differences Between the Two Systems
While a comprehensive line-by-line comparison of IFRS and GAAP is
outside the scope of this Note, there are a few key differences that merit
special attention. It is important to understand the differences between
GAAP and IFRS with respect to revenue recognition, uncertain tax posi-
tions, and the consolidation of special purpose entities. These differences
stand out because they are either particularly consequential or they play a
uniquely significant role in securities-fraud cases.
1. Revenue Recognition
The accounting treatments addressing revenue recognition are particu-
larly relevant in light of the frequency with which plaintiffs bring cases
alleging improper revenue recognition. Over ten percent of all securities
class actions brought in 2008 alleged that the defendant recognized revenue
in violation of GAAP." s Thus, the plaintiff s bar is sure to take particular
notice of any changes in the rules governing revenue recognition.
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101 ("SAB 101") is the first line of
authority in determining whether revenue should be recognized under the
GAAP system.' According to SAB 101, revenue should be recognized
113. KPMG, IFRS COMPARED TO U.S. GAAP: AN OVERVIEW 8-9 (2008), available at http://
www.kpmgifrsinstitute.con/documents/IFRS/721200810043IFRS%20compared%20to%20U.S.%2
OGAAP%2OAn%200verview%20(2008).pdf.
114. Navin Agrawal, The Impact of IFRS on Corporate Governance, LIVEMINT.COM, Oct. 2,
2008, http://www.livemint.com/2008/10/02001719/The-impact-of-lFRS-on-corporat.html?d= 1.
115. A comparison of GAAP and IFRS literature provides a sense of the differences in the
detail and the extent of the regulatory coverage of the two systems.
116. Gill, supra note 104, at 71.
117. Id.
118. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 83; see also Kathy S. Moffeit & A. Elaine Eikner,
Implementation of SAB 101, CPA J., Jan. 2003 at 56, 56 ("The SEC has indicated that revenue rec-
ognition is the largest cause for financial statement restatements.").
119. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, 17 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1999), available at http:
//www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab I01 .htm.
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when pervasive evidence of an arrangement exists, delivery has occurred or
services have been rendered, the seller's price to the buyer is fixed or de-
terminable, and collectability is reasonably assured. 20 But SAB 101 is just
the starting point. There are at least fifteen other authoritative statements
prescribing the proper treatment of revenue recognition in specific and nu-
anced contexts, and SAB 101 explicitly defers to them when they are
applicable. 2 2 For example, SAB 101 does not provide dispositive guidance
on how to handle revenue recognition when the purchaser of a good has the
right to return it. In such a situation, even if all the requirements of SAB 101
are met, the company may not recognize the revenue from the sale unless
the requirements of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 48123
("FAS 48") are met as well. According to FAS 48, when a right of return
exists, a seller may recognize the revenue from the sale of a product only if
all of the following conditions are met:
a) [t]he seller's price to the buyer is substantially fixed or determinable at
the date of sale[;] b) [t]he buyer has paid the seller, or the buyer is obli-
gated to pay the seller and the obligation is not contingent on resale of the
product[;] c) [t]he buyer's obligation to the seller would not be changed in
the event of theft or physical destruction or damage of the product[;I d)
[tihe buyer acquiring the product for resale has economic substance apart
from that provided by the seller[;] e) [t]he seller does not have significant
obligations for future performance to directly bring about resale of the
product by the buyer[;] [and] f) [t]he amount of future returns can be rea-
sonably estimated.'24
To further deprive companies of discretion in determining if revenue
should be recognized when a right of return exists, GAAP provides guide-
lines on guidelines. There is, for example, a four-factor test to help
determine whether the amount of future returns can reasonably be esti-
mated, the last of the core conditions of FAS 48.125 The regulators have
determined that the sale of products subject to a right of return is a subset of
the broader revenue-recognition category that warrants special attention and
regulation beyond that provided in FAS 48, and it is by no means the only
one. The regulators have also provided special, and somewhat extensive,
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. ("If a transaction is within the scope of specific authoritative literature that provides
revenue recognition guidance, that literature should be applied.").
123. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS No. 48: REVENUE RECOGNITION WHEN RIGHT OF RETURN ExisTs (1981).
124. Id. 16.
125. Id. 8 The following factors impair the ability to reasonably estimate future returns: "a)
The susceptibility of the product to significant external factors, such as technological obsolescence
or changes in demand[;] b) Relatively long periods in which a particular product may be returned[;]
c) Absence of historical experience with similar types of sales of similar products, or inability to
apply such experience because of changing circumstances, for example, changes in the selling en-
terprise's marketing policies or relationships with its customers[;] [and] d) Absence of a large
volume of relatively homogenous transactions." Id.
February 2010]
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guidelines for companies that receive revenue pursuant to franchise fees, 26
software sales,127 real estate sales,' and a host of other transactions in which
either the nature of the revenue or the manner in which it is collected is
deemed unique.1
2 9
International Accounting Standard No. 18 ("IAS 18") governs revenue
recognition under IFRS. According to lAS 18, a company should recog-
nize revenue only when the seller has transferred the risks and rewards of
ownership of the goods to the buyer, the seller surrenders control of the
goods to the buyer, the amount of revenue can be reasonably measured, it is
probable that the economic benefits associated with the transaction will flow
to the seller, and the costs incurred by the seller by virtue of the transaction
can be measured reliably. 3 ' Besides the general pronouncement contained in
IAS 18, however, IFRS provides very little microregulation of specific fac-
tual circumstances. 32 There is, for example, no specific IFRS authority
dictating when a company should recognize revenue after selling a product
subject to a right of return. There are a few contexts in which IFRS supple-
ments IAS 18 with additional guidance, such as revenue recognition for
long-term construction contracts, 33 but in general IAS 18 typifies the prin-
ciples-based approach of IFRS by giving companies only a broadly stated
directive.
2. Uncertain Tax Positions
The treatment afforded to uncertain tax positions is another area in
which GAAP and IMRS take dramatically different approaches. For a vari-
ety of reasons, companies often take aggressive tax positions, such as with
respect to deductions, without knowing whether the position would ulti-
126. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS No. 45: ACCOUNTING FOR FRANCHISE FEE REVENUE (1981).
127. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT OF POSITION No. 97-2:
SOFTWARE REVENUE RECOGNITION (1997).
128. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS No. 66: ACCOUNTING FOR SALES OF REAL ESTATE (1982).
129. See e.g., SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, supra note 119; see also FINAL REPORT
OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON IMPROVEMENTS TO FINANCIAL REPORTING TO THE UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 49 (2008) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMM. FINAL REPORT]
("[Tlhere is extensive revenue recognition guidance under U.S. GAAP spread across more than 140
pieces of literature, including specific guidance for software revenue and sales of real estate.");
BARRY J. EPSTEIN ET AL., WILEY GAAP: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF GAAP 1248
(2008) (noting that GAAP provides for "specific guidance on limited matters (e.g. software devel-
opment, construction)"); Rapp & Zell, supra note 20, at 3 ("Revenue recognition under U.S. GAAP
... is controlled by specific standards and rules that require industry-specific reporting practices.").
130. INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARD No. 18: REVENUE (1993) [hereinafter IAS No. 18].
131. Id.
132. See ADVISORY Comm. FINAL REPORT, supra note 129, at 49 ("[A] single IFRS standard
[IAS 18] provides general principles and illustrative examples to address virtually all reve-
nue-generating activities ...."); Rapp & Zell, supra note 20, at 3 ("Revenue recognition under
IFRS is based upon two broad standards and relatively few interpretations ....").
133. INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARD No. 11: CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (1993).
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mately be sustained in an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") audit.134 Since
financial reports are often issued, voluntarily or otherwise, prior to a final
determination of the propriety of an uncertain tax position,3 accounting
regulations provide guidance as to whether, and to what extent, that position
should appear on a financial report. Accounting for uncertain tax positions1- 136
can significantly affect a company's bottom line.
Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") Interpretation 48
("FIN 48") governs the manner in which uncertain tax positions must ap-
pear on a company's financial reports. FIN 48 permits a company to
recognize a financial benefit from an uncertain tax position only if "it is
[more likely than not] that the position will be ... sustained based on its
technical merits."'37 A position is "more likely than not" to be sustained if
there is "more than a 50 percent likelihood that the position would be sus-
tained if challenged and considered by the highest court in the relevant
jurisdiction."'' 3' To the extent possible, GAAP discourages management
guesswork in the determination of whether an uncertain tax position is
"more likely than not" to be sustained, and instead instructs companies to
look to the "technical merits" of the position. Companies must objectively
scrutinize the sustainability of the position by considering tax law, case law,
rulings and regulations issued by taxing authorities, and informal interac-
tions with taxing authorities.
39
134. AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, PRACTICE GUIDE ON ACCOUNTING FOR
UNCERTAIN TAX POSITIONS UNDER FIN 48, at 3 (2006), available at http://tax.aicpa.org/NR/
rdonlyres/8D2A444D-D158-4D5A-9F87-D8ED12A8A221/0/FIN48final.pdf [hereinafter AICPA
PRACTICE GUIDE].
135. See Teresa Iannaconi, Accounting for Income Tax Uncertainties, KPMG DEFINING IS-
SUES, July 2006, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2007: COUNSELING YOUR CLIENT FOR THE 2007
PROXY SEASON, at 673, 675 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1581,
2007).
136. For example, in 2006 GlaxoSmithKline agreed to pay the IRS $3.4 billion to settle a
long-time dispute over Glaxo's tax liability. Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS Accepts
Settlement Offer in Largest Transfer Pricing Dispute (Sept. 11, 2006), available at http://
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=162359,00.html.
Glaxo violated the internal revenue code in taking the position it did, and uncertain tax posi-
tion accounting rules govern whether those tax computation errors, if they appeared on financial
statements, were also accounting violations.
137. AICPA PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 134, at 4.
138. Id. If a portion of an uncertain tax position does not meet the more-likely-than-not
threshold, then the portion that does may still be recognized. For example, if there is a 49 percent
probability that a benefit of $100 will be sustained, but that probability rises to 51 percent if the
benefit is reduced to $90, the company may recognize a $90 tax benefit. See lannaconi, supra note
135, at 677.
139. AICPA PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 134, at 5; see also lannaconi, supra note 135, at
676 ("A company's position may be supported, in whole or in part, by unambiguous tax law, prior
experience with the taxing authority, and analysis that considers all relevant facts, circumstances,




IMRS currently does not explicitly address uncertain tax positions. 4°
Thus, under the current IFRS regime, companies are free to adjust uncertain
tax positions as they see fit, or even disregard the uncertainty of a tax
position altogether, subject only to the broad constraints contained in
various other IFRS provisions addressing income-tax reporting such as
International Accounting Standards No. 12 ("IAS 12").14 1
3. Consolidation of Special-Purpose Entities
A special-purpose entity ("SPE"), sometimes called a special-purpose
vehicle, is an entity created and capitalized by a company to carry out a
specific purpose or transaction. 142 SPEs are commonly used only as a me-
thod of keeping debt off of the balance sheet of the sponsor company.' 43 The
GAAP treatment of SPEs rose to special prominence on the national and
international stage after the collapse of Enron.' 44 Embarrassed by the deba-
cle, the regulators took to the task of tightening the rules governing when a
company needs to consolidate the financial statements of SPEs with its
145
own.
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140 ("FAS 140") gov-
erns the consolidation of SPEs under GAAP. 146 According to that provision,
140. Sheryl Vander Baan, Tax Issues Lurk in Conversion to IFRS, CROWE TAX NOTES,
March 2009, at 6, http://www.crowehorwath.com/Crowe/Publications/generatePubPDF.cfm?id=2063
("[N]o current IFRS guidance covers uncertain tax positions."). The IASB is expected to address this
omission, but the proposed regulation will likely bear little resemblance to FIN 48. Id. Instead, the
IASB plans to adopt the approach of International Accounting Standard No. 37 ("IAS 37"), which
applies to contingent assets and liabilities, in crafting the regulatory structure governing uncertain
tax positions. Id. Applying IAS 37 to uncertain tax positions would result in a regime under which a
putative tax benefit is always recognized, but the amount of recognition is adjusted for the uncer-
tainty of the position taking into account the probability weighted average of all possible outcomes,
as measured by management's virtually unchecked expectations. KPMG TAX GOVERNANCE INST.,
IFRS: TAX CONSIDERATIONS WHEN CONVERTING FROM U.S. GAAP 4 (2008), http://
www.taxgovemanceinstitute.com/documents/TGl/1032008173555080636TGI%201FRSTag.pdf;
Vander Baan, supra.
141. INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARD No. 12: INCOME TAXES (2000).
142. Jalal Soroosh & Jack T. Ciesielski, Accounting for Special Purpose Entities Revised:
FASB Interpretation 46(R), CPA J., July 2004, at 30, 30.
143. Id.
144. The most visible of Enron's many accounting violations appears to have been the failure
to consolidate the financial statements of three SPEs with its own, a violation that, when discovered,
led to a $586 million reduction in reported earnings and the exposure of debt that had previously
been hidden. William A. Niskanen, Don't Count Too Much on Financial Accounting, in AFTER
ENRON 47, 47-48 (William A. Niskanen ed., 2005).
145. SCOTT, supra note 12, at 453 (noting that the FASB issued FIN 46 in response to Enron);
Soroosh & Ciesielski, supra note 142, at 33 ("As the Enron crisis brought attention to the use of
SPEs, FASB responded by issuing a proposed interpretation of existing accounting principles aimed
at putting many off-balance-sheet entities back onto the balance sheet of the companies that created
them.").
146. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS No. 140: ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND
EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES (2000) [hereinafter FAS 140]. The discussion of SPE consolida-
tion in this section is extremely simplified. In addition to FAS 140 and FIN 46, the full GAAP
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a company must consolidate the financials of an SPE unless all of the fol-
lowing conditions are met: (a) the assets transferred to the SPE have been
isolated from the sponsor company, meaning they have been put beyond the
reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other receiv-
ership; (b) the SPE has the right to pledge or exchange the assets, and no
condition constrains the SPE from taking advantage of its right to pledge or
exchange and provides more than a trivial benefit to the transferor; and
(c) the transferor does not maintain effective control over the transferred
assets through either (1) an agreement that both entitles and obligates the
sponsor company to repurchase or redeem them before their maturity or
(2) the ability to unilaterally cause the holder to return specific assets.14 1 If,
however, the SPE is classified as a variable-interest entity ("VIE"), con-
solidation is always required. 48 According to FASB Interpretation No.
46(R) ("FIN 46(R)"),' 49 a VE is an SPE'50 that meets at least one of the fol-
lowing criteria: (1) The equity investors lack the direct or indirect ability
through voting rights or similar rights to make decisions about the entity's
activities that have a significant effect on the success of the business;
(2) The equity investors lack the obligation to absorb the expected losses of
the entity; (3) The equity investors lack the right to receive the expected
residual returns of the entity; (4) The total equity investment at risk is not
sufficient to permit the entity to finance its activities without additional
subordinated financial support provided by any parties, including equity
holders. 5' For purposes of the last avenue to VIE status, an equity invest-
ment of less than ten percent is presumed insufficient to permit the entity to
finance its own activities, although the existence of one of three enumerated
conditions can rebut the presumption. '1
The IFRS rules governing the consolidation of SPEs are much less de-
tailed than the GAAP rules, reflecting the principles-based approach of
IFRS. 53 According to International Accounting Standard No. 27 ("IAS
27"),114 a company must consolidate the financial information of an SPE into
treatment of SPE consolidation is governed by a combination of FSP FIN 46-3, FSP FIN 46-4, FSP
FIN 46-6, and FSP FIN 46-7. Soroosh & Ciesielski, supra note 142, at 33.
147. FAS 140, supra note 146, 9.
148. Soroosh & Ciesielski, supra note 142, at 34.
149. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION No. 46: CONSOLIDATION OF
VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES (2003) [hereinafter FIN 46(R)].
150. Some VIEs are not SPEs. Soroosh & Ciesielski, supra note 142, at 33.
151. FIN 46(R), supra note 149, 5; Soroosh & Ciesielski, supra note 142, at 33-34.
152. The three conditions are the following: 1) "[t]he entity has demonstrated that it can fi-
nance its activities without additional subordinated financial support"; 2) "[t]he entity has at least as
much equity invested as [comparable] entities that hold only similar assets of similar quality in
similar amounts and operate with no additional subordinated financial support"; and 3) "[tlhe
amount of equity invested in the entity exceeds the ... entity's expected losses based on reasonable
quantitative evidence." FIN 46(R), supra note 149, 9.
153. SCOTT, supra note 12, at 454.




its own financial statements if the SPE is under the company's "control."' 5
Control is presumed if the company owns more than one-half of the voting
power of an SPE. Control may also exist if, in substance, the company
appears to obtain the benefits of the SPE's operations, the company retains
the decision-making powers sufficient to obtain the benefits of the SPE's
operations, or the company otherwise has the right to obtain the benefits of
the SPE's operations, and is therefore also exposed to the risks incident to
the activities of the SPE. 1 6 Though the one-half voting power rule is
relatively clear cut, the other indicators of control evade the level of clarity
that typifies GAAP, giving management considerable discretion in
self-classifying. 17
III. THE IMPACT OF THE DIFFERENCES ON THE
SECURITIES ANTIFRAUD REGIME
The principles-based approach of IMRS, if adopted by the United States,
will have a significant effect on the functioning of the securities antifraud
regime. Section III.A argues that the flexibility of IFRS will hinder a plain-
tiff's ability to prove the various elements of the securities antifraud causes
of action, in particular the existence of a misstatement and scienter. Section
III.B dissects Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Coca-Cola Co., 5 a
typical 1Ob-5 case based on a GAAP violation in which shareholders sued
Coca-Cola for improper revenue recognition. Section IlI.B demonstrates
how the complaint and pleadings in that case would have been different had
the alleged improper revenue recognition occurred under IFRS instead of
GAAP.
A. The Impact of IFRS on the Securities Antifraud Regime
A great deal of ink has been spilled over the impact the principles-based
system of IFRS will have on a company's incentives to commit fraud. 9
Some commentators suggest that IFRS will discourage companies from
committing fraud because they will want to report conservatively to avoid
the possibility of litigation.16 Other commentators have concluded that IFRS
155. Id.
156. See ScOTr, supra note 12, at 571.
157. See also Psaros & Trotman, supra note 101, at 78 (noting that some IFRS countries think
of control only as "the capacity to dominate decision making").
158. 587 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
159. See generally Psaros & Trotman, supra note 101.
160. See id. at 77 (noting that commentators in the United States, Australia, Canada, and
Europe all believe that principles systems discourage a "show me where it says you can't do it atti-
tude" from financial-statement preparers) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rules-based systems
of regulation, the argument goes, "are always open to manipulation in the hands of clever and
high-priced accountants and lawyers pursuing regulatory arbitrage." Bratton, supra note 102, at
1041. Fraudsters can exploit loopholes to manipulate data while technically complying with the
strict letter of the rule. Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the
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will encourage companies to commit fraud because they will see the flexi-
bility of IFRS as an opportunity for aggressive reporting.' 6 Though the
differences between IFRS and GAAP may sway the level of corporate fraud
pervading the American business environment in one direction or another,
this Note does not seek to enter this debate. It is instead concerned with
answering a different question: what will the differences between IFRS and
GAAP mean for any given securities-fraud claim that has been filed?1
62
With the knowledge that corporate fraud exists, whatever its level,'13 the
SEC has designed a system to stop it. '64 GAAP violations play a significant165
role in that system. Since IFRS has been shown to be drastically different
than GAAP with respect to its financial-reporting requirements, the debate
over the prudence of U.S. conversion to GAAP is not complete without con-
sidering whether the differences between IFRS and GAAP will cause the
various securities antifraud provisions to operate differently on any particu-
lar claim that has been filed under one of them. IFRS will hamper the
current level of plaintiff success under the various securities antifraud pro-
visions because the elements of existence of a misstatement and scienter
will be harder to prove under IFRS than they are under GAAP.' 66
PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1097, 1108 (2007) ("[I]n numerous respects GAAP and (to a lesser
degree) GAAS have facilitated and even encouraged the recent accounting scandals."); Jennifer
Ralph Oppold, The Changing Landscape of Hedge Fund Regulation: Current Concerns and a Prin-
ciple-Based Approach, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 833, 878 (2008) ("Bright line rules can also be
easier to evade given the flexibility of financial instruments today, leading to behavior that is super-
ficially within the letter of the law but violates the spirit of it."); Karim Jamal, Going by the
numbers: how do we stop corporate fraud?, EXPRESS NEWS (Edmonton, Alta.), June 11, 2004,
available at http://www.expressnews.ualberta.ca/article.cfm?id=5880. Under principles, on the
other hand, management cannot rely on technical compliance with the regulation as a scapegoat,
because liability flows only when conduct appears offensive to a broadly stated objective. Since,
under principles, companies are deprived of the virtual safe harbor from litigation for reports that
comply with the strict letter of the rule, litigation-adverse companies will avoid aggressive and
fraudulent reporting.
161. See Psaros & Trotman, supra note 101, at 79 (citing several studies that all suggest that
the managers and auditors will report more aggressively under principles-based systems than they
will under rules-based systems). The line between "aggressive" reporting and "fraudulent" reporting
is not entirely clear. A finder of fact may be required to determine if a report is misleading.
162. Whether FRS will increase the level of fraud in the U.S. business environment has no
bearing on the answer to this question. This question centers on whether the various securities anti-
fraud provisions will operate differently after a claim has been filed, not on how many claims will
be filed or how many claims should be filed.
163. Mark, supra note 160, at 1097 ("Corporate accounting fraud has been widespread ... in
recent years."); Jamal, supra note 160, para. 7 ("[T]he U.S. has experienced a level and sophistica-
tion of fraud that is simply breathtaking, and more extreme than fraud observed in any other
developed country in the world ... .
164. See supra Section I.A.
165. See supra Sections I.B.1 and I.B.2.
166. It is important to note that this conclusion is a relevant consideration in the debate over
whether IFRS will encourage or discourage fraudulent reporting in the United States. See supra
notes 159-161 and accompanying text. If it is harder for plaintiffs to prove the elements of the secu-
rities antifraud causes of action under IFRS, then companies may perceive a greater chance of
getting away with securities fraud, and they will thus be more willing to commit securities fraud. In
this sense, IFRS will increase the level of corporate fraud in the United States. The level of corpo-
rate fraud in the United States, however, has no bearing on whether the domestic securities antifraud
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The existence of a misstatement, an element required in all securi-
ties-fraud cases, is much easier to prove under GAAP than it would be
under IFRS. When a company misrepresents its financial data under GAAP,
it essentially gift wraps and delivers the misstatement element to the plain-
tiff.'67 First, the sheer amount of GAAP rules creates a high likelihood that
the company violated at least one of them.16 Second, the black-and-white,
highly detailed nature of the rules 69 enables investors to easily expose the
violation. Conversely, when a company misrepresents its financial data un-
der IFRS, the existence of a misstatement can be a very difficult element to
prove. The plaintiff must first identify a rule addressing the accounting
treatment in question, and the infrequency with which IFRS dedicates itself
to specific situations may make this a difficult task.' 70 Even if the plaintiff is
able to identify a governing rule, the latitude in reporting given to manage-
ment under IFRS may hinder the ability of the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the company actually violated it.' 7' At the very least, the lack of IFRS rules
regime will function differently after a case has been filed if IFRS is adopted. For this reason, the
debate over whether LFRS will increase or decrease the level of corporate fraud in the United States,
though an important consideration in the debate over whether the United States should adopt IFRS,
has no place in a discussion over what IFRS will do to the current functioning of the securities anti-
fraud regime, the focus of this Note.
167. Even GAAP, however, is occasionally susceptible to bona fide disputes over whether its
mandates have been violated. For example, some courts require expert testimony to establish if there
has been a violation of GAAP. See, e.g., SEC v. Guenthner, 395 E Supp. 2d 835, 847 (D. Neb. 2005)
("Whether defendant's actions ... complied with GAAP is a question that requires technical, and
specialized knowledge. The standards of conduct . . . under these circumstances is [sic] not within
the court's general knowledge and experience. The need for expert testimony in this case is analo-
gous to the need for expert testimony on the standard of care in a professional malpractice case.").
But the fact that a court may request expert testimony to explain a particular GAAP rule and opine
as to whether there was a violation does not necessarily mean that the violation was not clear to the
expert. There are situations, however, in which even accounting experts will disagree about whether
a GAAP rule has been violated. E.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th
Cir. 1994) (discounting the extent to which a GAAP violation was probative of scienter at the sum-
mary judgment stage because reasonable accountants could resolve differently the complex issues of
accounting). But since the ambiguity of a certain GAAP provision may occasionally make it diffi-
cult for a plaintiff to establish the existence of a misstatement, plaintiffs will face greater difficulty
establishing the existence of a misstatement under IFRS to the extent IFRS is more unclear and
ambiguous, as shown to be the case. See supra Part 1I.
168. Bratton, supra note 102, at 1037 (noting that accounting rules "constrain managers ...
most of the time").
169. Hague, supra note 15, at 2 ("The IFRS are unlike U.S. GAAP, which tends to go into
much greater detail.").
170. John J. Huber, Client Alert: SEC Accepts Final Statements from Foreign Private Issuers
Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP if Prepared Under International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards, in FOREIGN ISSUERS & THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 2008: STRATEGIES FOR THE CHANGING
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT, at 219, 223 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No.
B-1669, 2008) ("The SEC also acknowledged that there are a number of areas for which IFRS does
not yet provide a specific standard or interpretation. For example, the SEC recognized there are
currently no specific standards or interpretations for the accounting treatment of common control
mergers, recapitalizations, reorganizations, and acquisitions of minority interests."); see also supra
Part II.
171. See Bratton, supra note 102, at 1037 ("So long as we lack confidence in management
incentives respecting accounting treatments and doubt that auditors are independent of management
interests, we have no actor plausibly positioned to make the delicate law-to-fact determinations
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and the flexibility that they provide management will frequently force
heated and costly litigation to adjudicate the misrepresentation element,1 2
and the flexibility of IFRS will rear its head again at the litigation stage as a
powerful defense to charges that a company's financial statements do not
comport with standardized accounting practices.
The existence of scienter, another commonly required element in securi-
ties-fraud cases, is also easier to prove under GAAP than IFRS. Under
current case law, a plaintiff who establishes the misstatement element by
demonstrating a GAAP violation can often use that misstatement as persua-
sive evidence of scienter.17 To the extent that IFRS hinders a plaintiffs
ability to prove the existence of a misstatement, IFRS presents a corre-
sponding detriment to a plaintiffs ability to prove scienter. But IFRS will
diminish a plaintiffs ability to prove scienter in another way. The rationale
behind using GAAP violations as evidence of scienter is that GAAP is a
very cut-and-dry system.174 It instructs companies exactly how to behave
'75
and provides rules for nearly every conceivable contingency. Since com-
panies have such a detailed handbook at their disposal, some courts employ
a presumption that any derogation from its mandates is likely to be inten-
tional. 76A child who comes home at 1:00 a.m. after being told to come
home at midnight not only violated the rule, he probably did so culpably
since it is such an easy rule to follow. Conversely, companies charged with
violating IFRS can argue that the violation is merely a product of the inno-
cent exercise of discretion given to them under that system. A child who
comes home at an unreasonable hour after being told to be home at a rea-
sonable hour violated the rule, but it is not clear that he did so culpably
since his parent gave him so little guidance. Thus, the flexibility of IFRS
provides companies with two opportunities to shirk responsibility under the
called for in a principles-based system. If the regulator is not neutral, then a principle always can be
manipulated in favor of the presentation that suits management interests.").
172. See Niskanen, supra note 144, at 47-51 ("The primary reason why the U.S. GAAP is
especially complex appears to be an attempt to reduce the risks of litigation."); Katherine Schipper,
Principles-Based Accounting Standards, 17 ACT. HORIZONs 61, 69 (2003); Letter from Donna J.
Fisher, Am. Bankers Ass'n Dir. of Tax and Accounting, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y of the SEC
(Sept. 21, 2007) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) ("[M]any preparers [of financial state-
ments] tend to prefer rules-based accounting in order to mitigate [the] litigation risk.").
173. See supra Section I.B.2.
174. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Part II.
176. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. This is not to say that there are no GAAP
provisions that are ambiguous, confusing, or broadly stated. Indeed, even the most sophisticated
accountants and corporate officers may have trouble complying with some GAAP provisions. Many
courts have recognized this and refused to infer scienter from the mere presence of a violation of a
GAAP provision, especially an unclear one. E.g., In re IMAX Sec. Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 471, 482
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("If this were merely a GAAP violation case, we might have been persuaded that
the complaint fails to allege scienter with respect to the IMAX defendants because the applicable
accounting rules appear to be highly complex ... "). However, since some courts are willing to
exculpate corporate officers for violating unclear GAAP provisions, courts should be more willing
to exculpate corporate officers for violating IFRS provisions to the extent those provision are less
clear and direct, as shown to be the case. See supra Part 11.
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securities antifraud laws, one at the misstatement stage of proof and another
at the scienter stage.
B. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. The Coca-Cola Co.
The likely impact of IFRS on the domestic securities antifraud regime is
illustrated best when the arguments in Section III.A are applied to a typical
lOb-5 case involving an allegation of a GAAP violation.77 Though it is
impossible to determine how Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v.
Coca-Cola Co. 17 would have been resolved had IFRS been the governing
accounting system, it is safe to say that the plaintiff shareholders would
have faced drastically different challenges at the complaint and pleadings
stages.
In 1999 and 2000, the Coca-Cola Company (Coke) shipped several
hundred million dollars worth of "excessive, unwanted, and unneeded"
beverage concentrate to its various bottling companies, causing the invento-
ries of these companies to balloon uncontrollably."9 The bottling companies
accepted the shipments because Coke assured them, sometimes contractu-
ally and sometimes informally, that Coke would either accept return of later
unused concentrate or help the bottler unload the excess concentrate by de-
livering it to other bottlers if it did not sell.'80 The interests that Coke owned
in these companies were not sufficient to require the consolidation of their
financial statements with its own, 8' and so Coke recorded the transfer of
massive amounts of concentrate as unqualified revenue on its financial
statements immediately upon shipment. According to the complaint, these
excess shipments netted Coke over $600 million in increased revenue."'
177. As mentioned at supra note 83 and accompanying text, a significant percentage of cases
filed every year under the various securities antifraud causes of action allege GAAP violations. As
mentioned at supra note 118 and accompanying text, a significant portion of these cases allege a
violation of GAAP due to improper revenue recognition. Though plaintiffs will face greater diffi-
culty in establishing the elements of misstatement and scienter when they bring suit pursuant to an
improperly recorded uncertain tax position, the improper consolidation or nonconsolidation of an
SPE, or any other accounting treatment where IFRS gives management more discretion than does
GAAP, the Coke case is profiled here because of the prevalence with which revenue-recognition
cases are brought, the considerable clarity of the issues in the case, and its relatively high-profile
nature. The purpose of the presentation of this revenue-recognition case is merely to illustrate the
impact of flexibility in financial reporting, in any context, on the elements of misstatement and
scienter, and not to detract from the importance of the other areas of standardized accounting where
IFRS provides for greater flexibility than does GAAP.
178. 587 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
179. E.g., Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 at 4, Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (No.
I:00-CV-2838-WBH) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint]. When this case eventually set-
tled, Coke refused to admit any liability. The SEC, however, found the allegations to be true. Harry
R. Weber, Justice Dept. Ends Probe of Coca-Cola; Firm Settles With SEC, WASH. POST, Apr. 19,
2005, at E2.
180. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, supra note 179,1 129.
181. E.g.,id.954,55.
182. Id. 45.
183. E.g.,id. I 101(b).
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On October 27, 2000, shareholders filed suit alleging, inter alia, that
Coke recognized revenue from the sales of excessive concentrate in viola-
tion of GAAP.'84 The plaintiffs relied on FAS 48 as the governing rule,
which applies to the recognition of revenue from products that are subject to
a right of return.185 As discussed in Section II.B.1, FAS 48 permits revenue
from the sale of a product subject to a right of return to be recognized only
if six conditions are met. According to the plaintiffs, the second condition,
that the buyer's obligation to pay the seller is not contingent upon resale of
the product, had not been met because Coke had told the bottlers that they
were not obligated to pay for the concentrate if they could not use it.
186
Likewise, the fifth condition, that the seller does not have significant obliga-
tions for future performance to directly bring about resale of the product by
the buyer, had not been met because Coke had a future obligation to find
another buyer of the concentrate if the original bottler could not use it.,s7
Since only four of the six conditions of FAS 48 were met, Coke violated
GAAP when it recognized the revenue from the sales of excess concentrate.
Not only did this GAAP violation form a misstatement sufficient to support
a cause of action under lOb-5, s8 argued the plaintiffs, but it was convincing
evidence of scienter as well because it was such a significant violation that
it probably would not have occurred if the defendants had not authorized
i.189it.
ls
After about eight years of litigation, Coke settled with a class of share-
holders for an aggregate total of $137.5 million.'9°Though many issues
arose during the course of the prolonged litigation, a linchpin of the plain-
tiffs' success was their argument that recognizing the revenue from the
shipment of excessive concentrate, which was intended to inflate Coke's
financial standing, was a violation of GAAP.' 9'
But how convincing would this argument have been under IFRS? Since
there is no MFRS provision specifically governing the sale of products sub-






189. Id. I 36(b) ("The bases for allegations regarding defendants scienter include [that the]
•.. [diefendants' scheme to artificially inflate Coke's reported financial performance and stock price
involved numerous and significant violations of GAAP ... and these GAAP violations necessitated
defendants' direct involvement as they consented to, authorized and participated in these wrongful
practices....").
190. See Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Coca-Cola Co., 587 R Supp. 2d 1266, 1268
(N.D. Ga. 2008).
191. For example, in Coke's motion to dismiss, Coke does not even challenge the plaintiffs'
contention that Coke violated FAS 48, essentially conceding the point. See Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Carpenters
Health & Welfare Fund, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (No. 1:00-CV-2838-WBH).
192. See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.
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have been examined under the general revenue recognition guidelines set
forth in IAS 18. As discussed in Section II.B.1, revenue recognition is
proper under IAS 18 only when (a) the seller has transferred the risks and
rewards of ownership of the goods to the buyer; (b) the seller surrenders
control of the goods to the buyer; (c) the amount of revenue can be reasona-
bly measured; (d) it is probable that the economic benefits associated with
the transaction will flow to the seller; and (e) the costs incurred by the seller
by virtue of the transaction can be measured reliably.'93 The third and fifth
conditions are unquestionably satisfied in the Coke case. Neither the price
nor quantities of the concentrate delivered were in question, and provisions
three and five inquire only into the monetary characteristics of the transac-
tion. The existence of the other three conditions, however, is not as clear.
Facilitating the lack of clarity are several ambiguous terms contained in
these provisions. For example, IAS 18 provides no additional guidance as to
what constitutes "control" and when it has been "surrendered," what the
"risks and rewards of ownership" actually are and when they are deemed
"transferred," or when the likelihood of benefits flowing to the seller meets
the "probable" threshold. Even if the plaintiffs were able to convince the
court that Coke violated IAS 18, and thus committed a misstatement when it
recognized revenue from the sales of the concentrate, the violation itself
would be of negligible value in the attempt to establish scienter. The defen-
dants could simply argue that their decision to recognize revenue, though
ultimately deemed incorrect, was reasonable in light of the ambiguity of the
governing IFRS rule.
Although the revenue-recognition techniques employed by Coke during
the turn of the century unquestionably created a false impression of its fi-
nancial position, it is not difficult to conceptualize either how a defense to
these allegations would sound if IFRS had been the governing system or the
obvious viability of that defense. The flexibility of the IFRS guidelines
makes this defense possible, and flexibility is a systematic characteristic of
the IFRS standards, not one confined only to revenue recognition.' 94 GAAP,
on the other hand, as demonstrated by the Coke case, reduces the eviden-
tiary burden of plaintiffs who suspect that a corporation is up to something
funny by creating bright-line rules that allow for easy implementation and
detection when they are violated.
CONCLUSION
A PricewaterhouseCoopers memorandum informing executives on the
details and likelihood of the accounting change noted that, if the United
States made the switch from GAAP to IMRS, "the legal and regulatory en-
193. IAS No. 18, supra note 130.
194. See supra Part H.
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vironment will need to evolve in ways that remain to be seen.' '95 Though the
full effects of IMRS implementation in the United States might not become
evident until it actually happens, this Note anticipates a significant one: the
diminished ability of plaintiffs to prove the elements of existence of a mis-
statement and scienter under the various securities antifraud provisions.
IFRS sacrifices rules for principles in an attempt to ensure a "true and
fair view" of a company's financial position. But regardless of the effects
FRS will have on a company's incentives to misrepresent its financial data
before suit is filed, the debate over conversion is not complete without con-
sidering what IFRS will do to the securities antifraud regime after suit has
been filed.
Evidence that a company committed a GAAP violation is currently pro-
bative of the elements of existence of a misstatement and scienter under the
securities antifraud laws. To the extent the flexibility of FRS makes it
harder for plaintiffs to prove that a company committed an IFRS violation
than it is for plaintiffs to prove that a company committed a GAAP viola-
tion, plaintiffs will face greater difficulty establishing the existence of a
misstatement if IFRS is adopted. Further, since the flexibility of IFRS will
provide a viable defense to allegations that a company acted culpably in
misrepresenting its financial data, plaintiffs will face greater difficulty es-
tablishing scienter if IFRS is adopted. Since IFRS will occasionally result in
a finding of no misstatement or no scienter when GAAP would not, 96 the
domestic securities antifraud regime will function differently under IFRS
than it currently does under GAAP.
195. International Financial Reporting Standards: The Right Move for US Business, 10 MIN-
UTES ON IFRS (PricewaterhouseCoopers), Oct. 2007, at 3, available at http://www.pwc.coml
enUS/us/l0minutes/assets/pwc_ 10minutes_102007.pdf.
196. It is possible for GAAP to require a finding of no misstatement or no scienter when IFRS
does not. However, the general flexibility of IFRS as compared to GAAP naturally suggests that the
opposite will more commonly be true. Further, it is worth noting that there is cause for concern
anytime the two systems require a different outcome, regardless of the directions.
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